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INTRODUCTION
“Code is law.”

1

This bold proclamation, championed by the Bitcoin community,
is meant to be a summation of the “new world order”2 ushered in by

* © 2019 Henry S. Zaytoun.
1. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 5 (2d ed. 2006) (rewording the
phrasing of other cyberspace advocates).
2. See, e.g., Nikola Grozdanovic, Cryptocurrencies: A New Financial World Order,
WORLD FIN. (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.worldfinance.com/markets/cryptocurrencies-anew-financial-world-order [https://perma.cc/93DL-7MRU]; Brian Worley, Into the Ether,
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innovations in peer-to-peer software protocols3 commonly known as
blockchain technology. These protocols make it possible for
individuals to safely and securely complete transactions in digital
information of some value, also known as “cryptocurrency,”4 without
the need for either a central authority5 to act as a third party or
government-enforced rule of law.6 But what happens when code fails
to protect the basic rights that our existing laws have always sought to
protect?
Bitcoin—a cryptocurrency that is one form of blockchain
information—continues to dominate the daily headlines, primarily
due to its wild fluctuations in market price.7 The all-time-high market
price reached in 2017 correlates, unsurprisingly, with the record
number of transactions8 and wallet users9 achieved. But the meteoric
rise in price occurred without much public discussion of blockchain’s
technological innovation outside of a relatively small group of

COINREPORT (July 27, 2016), https://coinreport.net/into-the-ether-ethereum/ [https://perma.cc/
GB9X-K53K].
3. Protocols, in this sense, are the rules written into the code that govern how the
software may be used. See PEDRO FRANCO, UNDERSTANDING BITCOIN:
CRYPTOGRAPHY, ENGINEERING, AND ECONOMICS 18 (2015).
4. The use of this term merely reflects common usage and the common
understanding of the items of value exchanged in basic blockchain transactions. It is not to
suggest that these items of value are currency. While some maintain and advocate this
position, whether or not the items are currency is inconsequential to the inquiry here. In
addition, while the creator of blockchain protocols, Satoshi Nakamoto, and others argued
that these items must have value, I do not argue that point here. Rather, this Comment
merely assumes a basic premise that if a market exists for some item, it therefore has some
value.
5. See SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC
CASH SYSTEM 4, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4LH-SC68].
6. See John V. Orth, The Rule of Law, 19 GREEN BAG 2D 175, 179 (noting the
“generic” definition of the term to mean “a legal system that prevents arbitrariness,
guarantees equal treatment, and – in many usages – enforces contracts and protects
property”). One of the earliest advocates of Bitcoin, Erik Voorhees, now runs a website
devoted to promoting Bitcoin and explaining the underlying blockchain technology. The
website’s tagline is a quotation that embodies the above described sentiment: “Give me
control of a nation’s money, and I care not who makes its laws.” MONEY & ST.,
http://moneyandstate.com [https://perma.cc/8YPZ-FY6Q].
7. E.g., Samuel Gibbs, Bitcoin Drops $2,000 in Value as South Korea Announces
Planned Trading Ban, GUARDIAN (Jan. 11, 2018, 5:42 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2018/jan/11/bitcoin-drops-value-south-korea-trading-ban-cryptocurrencies-taxgambling [https://perma.cc/C2DE-X8SL (staff-uploaded archive)].
8. Confirmed Transactions Per Day, BLOCKCHAIN (Aug. 27, 2018),
https://blockchain.info/charts/n-transactions?timespan=1year [https://perma.cc/RME5-L6GW].
9. Blockchain Wallet Users, BLOCKCHAIN (Aug. 27, 2018), https://blockchain.info/
charts/my-wallet-n-users?timespan=all [https://perma.cc/Z82M-XHQU].
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advocates and academics.10 This may be partly by design—in the early
efforts to brand Bitcoin in a palatable, easy-to-understand way,
advocates referred to Bitcoin as “digital gold,”11 a cryptocurrency,12
and, most simply, as a new form of money.13 Yet it is the blockchain
code, rather than Bitcoin in particular, that is garnering the largest
investments for further development from companies like Google,
Citibank, and Goldman Sachs.14 In addition, companies like IBM are
actively developing blockchain technology for use by a variety of
business.15
These investments and developments appear to be the result of
varied potential uses of the blockchain protocol beyond mere
“storage and transfer” of Bitcoin as currency.16 The list of alternate
applications is long—digital asset, smart property, micropayments,
crowdfunding, smart contracts, and storage of metadata—but, as of
this writing, each remains in the relatively early stages of
development.17 Some argue that these applications are operable using
10. See Trevor I. Kiviat, Note, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain
Transactions, 65 DUKE L.J. 569, 571–72 (2015).
11. See Jeff Cox, Novogratz: Bitcoin is ‘Digital Gold’ and Will End the Year at $10,000,
CNBC (Nov. 21, 2017, 11:27 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/21/novogratz-Bitcoin-isdigital-gold-and-will-end-the-year-at-10000.html [https://perma.cc/EGD6-GKYA].
12. NAKAMOTO, supra note 5.
13. Erik Voorhees, The Role of Bitcoin as Money, MONEY & ST. (May 23, 2013),
http://moneyandstate.com/role-Bitcoin-money/ [https://perma.cc/JN2E-D9U4] (“Forget the
tech. Forget the mining. Forget the cryptography and the peer to peer networks and the
open source code. . . . The core of the Bitcoin experiment is not about tech at all, it’s about
money.”). This might explain, in part, why the main focus of Bitcoin reporting centers on
the daily fluctuations in its price.
14. Blockchain Investment Trends in Review, CBINSIGHTS, https://www.cbinsights.com/
research/report/blockchain-trends-opportunities/ [https://perma.cc/CY6R-XBG6]. “Since
2012, corporates have participated in 140+ equity investments totaling nearly $1.2
[billion],” with most of that total coming in the last three years. Id. At the same time,
however, some banks, like Goldman Sachs, are investing in Bitcoin futures. Dakin
Campbell & Laura J. Keller, Goldman Sachs Plans to Clear Bitcoin Futures When They
Go Live, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 7, 2017, 4:05 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-12-07/goldman-sachs-is-said-to-clear-bitcoin-futures-when-they-go-live
[https://perma.cc/7G7Q-MZTV (dark archive)].
15. Unpack Research into Leading Blockchain Use Cases Here, IBM,
https://www.ibm.com/blockchain/use-cases/?cm_mmc=Search_Google-_-Blockchain+and+Watson+
Financial+Services_Blockchain-_-WW_NA-_-+Public++Private++Blockchain_Broad_CoG&cm_m
mca2=10007330&cm_mmca7=9009670&cm_mmca8=kwd-413097755984&cm_mmca9=4046a6b3-9
f59-4422-849e-a062164cc286&cm_mmca10=250822637185&cm_mmca11=b&mkwid=4046a6b3-9f5
9-4422-849e-a062164cc286&cvosrc=ppc.google.&cvo_campaign=000026VG&cvo_crid=2508226371
85&Matchtype=b&gclid=CjwKCAjw39reBRBJEiwAO1m0OfT2a39dcUR2xK8QWzZl7mY8op
mFr0V1ElWA5J7TQVmFYQuUq7zAahoCsbMQAvD_BwE [https://perma.cc/GF2A-EHQK]
(identifying thirty-three use cases to date).
16. FRANCO, supra note 3, at 183.
17. See generally id. at 183–207 (detailing the various types of digital assets).
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current blockchain protocol with few, if any, changes required.18 But
because of the undeveloped nature of these use cases, most scholarly
articles are devoted to Bitcoin’s use and regulatory efforts directed at
treating Bitcoin as money.19 Still others explore the idea of Bitcoin as
a security20 or a commodity.21 At the same time, however, both
scholarly and development-focused efforts tend to sidestep one of the
major issues plaguing blockchain to date: theft.
While the impact of cryptocurrency theft is presently limited to
niche markets and a select group of investors, it will become a more
widespread problem as the underlying blockchain technology is
implemented across industries. This threat forecasts the potential for
huge economic loss. Perhaps more importantly, it also undermines a
universal principle of any organized society, one that most intuitively
accept as true22: “[i]t is a crime to steal what belongs to someone
else.”23 And rule of law values are implicit in this principle—that
“rule by law” is an important aspect of effective government and a
bulwark against tyranny.24
These principles, however, are merely a starting point—both
raise important questions concerning what actions a society considers
theft and the things that may be objects of theft.25 The concepts are
interrelated; each tends to track closely both societal and economic
developments.26 As Bitcoin continues to dominate public
conversation and remains the most widely used cryptocurrency27 to
date, it provides the best conduit to explore the application of these
concepts to blockchain and blockchain-based assets.
It is estimated that, since its inception, over 980,000 Bitcoins
have been lost through unauthorized takings, mostly individual

18. Id. at 183.
19. E.g., Ed Howden, Comment, The Crypto-Currency Conundrum: Regulating an
Uncertain Future, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 741, 761–63 (2015).
20. E.g., Christopher Burks, Recent Development, Bitcoin: Breaking Bad or Breaking
Barriers, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 244, 246 (2017).
21. E.g., Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, Advancing a Framework for
Regulating Cryptocurrency Payment Intermediaries, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 495, 507–11
(2015).
22. See STUART P. GREEN, THIRTEEN WAYS TO STEAL A BICYCLE 1 (2012) (“[I]t is
hard to imagine any organized society without [prohibitions on theft].”).
23. LAURENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY
108 (1993).
24. Orth, supra note 6, at 181.
25. Michael E. Tigar, The Right of Property and the Law of Theft, 62 TEX. L. REV.
1443, 1443–44 (1984).
26. Id. at 1444.
27. For discussion of cryptocurrency, see infra Part II.
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accounts located on major Bitcoin exchanges.28 This loss represents
an amount over $3.5 billion,29 and most of these losses have occurred
within the last four years.30 When such losses occur, the media often
reports them in terms of theft.31 This reaction implies a general
understanding, without analysis, that such a taking is legally theft—
that is, the taking of a thing (Bitcoin) belonging to someone else that
society recognizes as an action deserving punishment. This framing
generally mirrors the response by victims of Bitcoin theft.
While some individuals simply accept this risk of loss as an
inevitable result of participating in the Bitcoin market,32 a growing
number are complaining to regulatory agencies about the problem.33
This uptick in complaints is due in part to the rapid increase in losses
attributed to Bitcoin theft, and the fact that once a Bitcoin is stolen, it

28. Jim Finkle & Jeremy Wagstaff, Hackers Steal $64 Million from Cryptocurrency
Firm NiceHash, REUTERS (Dec. 6, 2017, 10:20 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uscyber-nicehash/hackers-steal-64-million-from-cryptocurrency-firm-nicehash-idUSKBN1E10AQ
[https://perma.cc/7P2X-J5TK].
29. Calculated using the coinbaseUSD exchange rate on November 26, 2018 at 9:10
p.m. For this rate, as well as other rates of exchange, see BITCOINCHARTS,
https://Bitcoincharts.com [https://perma.cc/4EFV-9J93].
30. See Timothy W. Martin, Eun-Young Jeong & Steven Russolillo, North Korea Is
Suspected in Bitcoin Heist, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 20, 2017, 6:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/north-korea-is-suspected-in-Bitcoin-robbery-1513790899 [https://perma.cc/9YEWQVKT (dark archive)]; Rishi Iyengar, More than $70 Million Stolen in Bitcoin Hack, CNN
(Dec. 8, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/12/07/technology/nicehash-Bitcoin-theft-hacking/
index.html [https://perma.cc/EBV2-92S3]; Justina Lee, Even a $31 Million Hack Couldn’t
Keep Bitcoin Down, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 21, 2017, 1:22 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-11-21/bitcoin-falls-after-31-million-theft-of-cryptocurrency-tether
[https://perma.cc/23EE-9BUQ (dark archive)]; Robert McMillan, The Inside Story of Mt.
Gox, Bitcoin’s $460 Million Disaster, WIRED (Mar. 3, 2014, 6:30 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2014/03/Bitcoin-exchange/ [https://perma.cc/6WW6-CQ4L (dark
archive)].
31. Finkle & Wagstaff, supra note 28.
32. See Matt Levine, Bitcoin Bankruptcy Wasn’t Really a Bust, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 14,
2017, 2:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-11-14/bitcoin-bankruptcywasn-t-really-a-bust [https://perma.cc/SE2E-FD52 (dark archive)].
33. See Lily Katz & Julie Verhage, Bitcoin Exchange Sees Complaints Soar,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 30, 2017, 8:15 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201708-30/bitcoin-exchange-sees-complaints-soar-as-users-demand-money [https://perma.cc/
7ZUY-GLYU (dark archive)] (comparing the 6 complaints about Coinbase in 2016 to at
least 293 complaints in 2017 filed with the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau—
mostly due to “money not available when promised” but with a significant number of
complaints related to “fraud or scam”); Jen Wieczner, Hacking Coinbase: The Great
Bitcoin Bank Robbery, FORTUNE (Aug. 22, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/22/Bitcoincoinbase-hack/ [https://perma.cc/8LPZ-LC9T] (noting that complaints to the FBI’s
Internet Crime Complaint Center concerning “losses from crimes involving virtual
currency were . . . more than triple[d]” in 2016 when compared to 2015).
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is unlikely that the lost Bitcoin will ever be recovered.34 In a
normative sense, however, this reaction demonstrates the general
proposition that victims of unauthorized takings expect protection
and redress from the traditional source: the government.35 Public
perception, as alluded to above,36 further supports this normative
view. Yet, as a prominent member of the Bitcoin community candidly
admits, “no one . . . has gone to jail for . . . electronically pilfering
cryptocurrencies.”37
This growing tension surrounding unauthorized takings of
Bitcoin—and the slow pace of actionable steps taken by both
prosecutors and the government in general—stands in stark contrast
to prior government responses to innovations in theft. In the not-sodistant past, both state and federal legislative bodies and law
enforcement agencies implemented a rigorous approach to theft and
cybercrime. The National Stolen Property Act (“NSPA”) was an
initial response to perceived gaps in state larceny laws to counter
fraudulent transfers of stolen property.38 When the advent of
computers complicated this scheme, Congress introduced the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) to enlarge prosecutors’
toolkits.39 The CFAA was subsequently amended numerous times
over the following thirty-plus years.40 Prior to its passage, prosecutors
relied on the mail and wire fraud statutes as a stop-gap measure to
combat fraud perpetrated in the new computer forum.41 None of the
34. Finkle & Wagstaff, supra note 28; see also Alexandra Harney & Steve Stecklow,
Twice Burned – How Mt. Gox’s Bitcoin Customers Could Lose Again, REUTERS (Nov. 16,
2017, 1:15 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/bitcoin-gox/ [https://perma.cc/
TY8Y-KHS3].
35. See NATHANIEL POPPER, DIGITAL GOLD 114 (2015) (“[I]n each case of big theft,
Bitcoin users eventually went to government authorities to seek redress . . . .”).
36. See, e.g., Mike Huynh, Latest Bitcoin Theft Bankrupts South Korean
Cryptocurrency Exchange, D’MARGE (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.dmarge.com/2017/12/
Bitcoin-theft.html [https://perma.cc/NS8Z-HNJP]. Additionally, the article’s subheading,
“Another day, another stolen Bitcoin” succinctly sums up this perception. Id.
37. Wieczner, supra note 33. Coinbase is one of the largest Bitcoin exchanges
currently in existence, offering both storage services and a platform to facilitate
transactions in Bitcoin and other digital currencies. About Coinbase, COINBASE,
https://www.coinbase.com/about [https://perma.cc/3N38-EACX].
38. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud and the Development of
Intangible Property Rights in Information, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 683, 697 (2000)
[hereinafter Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud].
39. See COMPUT. CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES 1 (Scott Eltringham et al. eds., 2010) (explaining that
Congress created the CFAA, in part, to help address emerging computer crimes that
current statutes lacked the “tools . . . to combat”).
40. Id. at 1–3.
41. Id. at 1.
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above provisions, however, has yet been applied to the “electronic[]
pilfering [of] cryptocurrencies.”42
With blockchain’s increasing prevalence and the promising
potential of its widespread application, now is the time for
prosecutors to act. Not only would prosecution of cryptotheft
reinforce rule-of-law values, but it would also address societal
expectations that unauthorized takings of blockchain-based assets are
what they appear to be—theft. Such prosecutions would achieve the
critical objectives of regulatory schemes—fostering trust in
blockchain-based assets and a safe playing field for innovation—in a
way that would be less onerous to developing blockchain’s uses across
industries. By targeting the bad actors, as opposed to regulating
technology’s operation, blockchain developers will retain the freedom
to continue developing the technology without sacrificing other
important societal goals and values.
This Comment argues that prosecutors already have the tools
necessary to confront this rise in theft.43 To lay the foundation of the
law of theft, Part I highlights the technical aspects of blockchain
protocol and Bitcoin that are relevant to this discussion. Tracing
blockchain’s development explains in part the early—often
contradictory—efforts to define Bitcoin. It is also crucial to
understanding why Bitcoin is best understood as property, which in
turn clarifies the operation of the most common instances of theft
from online exchanges. Part II then defines Bitcoin. Part III addresses
the shortcomings of the most applicable federal theft statutes, the
NSPA and CFAA, when applied to theft of Bitcoin. It then proposes
that the Wire Fraud provision is a critical stop-gap measure for
deterring such theft that serves both to protect individuals’ interest in
Bitcoin and the future development of blockchain protocol. Lastly,
Part IV argues that prosecutors should move to enforce these
provisions, while noting the social and economic realities of
enforcement. It raises questions that Congress, government
regulators, and the Bitcoin community should consider when
searching for an equitable solution to this pervasive risk.

42. Weiczner, supra note 33.
43. Bitcoin is implicated in a number of other criminal schemes, all of which fall
outside the scope of this Comment. For a discussion of other criminal issues involving
cryptocurrency, see Rainer Böhme et al., Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, and
Governance, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 213, 230 (2015).
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I. BLOCKCHAIN PROTOCOL: THE BASICS
While blockchain increasingly receives scholarly attention, most
people’s familiarity with the technology does not extend far past news
headlines. This is certainly understandable considering that
blockchain is a product of the relatively niche field of cryptography,
which is replete with complicated math and deals exclusively in
source code.44 Furthermore, it seems that most primers on the
technology are geared toward individual investors with the hope of
securing that investor’s business.45 As blockchain continues to be
developed and utilized across business cases, one would expect an
increase in resources on the subject. This is not to say that in-depth
analyses of blockchain are nonexistent. On the contrary, a number of
scholars have already taken up the task of explaining the technical
and legal implications of certain aspects of the technology. It is from
these early efforts that an understanding of the application of the law
of theft may be developed.
As a preliminary matter, the blockchain protocol allows two
people to transact without the need for a “trusted third party”
intermediary.46 What is transacted between them is a specific line of
code that is mathematically impossible to replicate.47 Every
transaction is recorded on a publicly accessible ledger—the
“blockchain.”48 These aspects of blockchain most excite companies,
investors, and the public at large because the protocol provides a safe,
transparent, and direct system of exchanging valuable information.
But a more developed understanding of these basic principles is an
essential prerequisite to applying criminal provisions.49
44. Lauri Hartikka, A Blockchain in 200 Lines of Code, MEDIUM (Mar. 4, 2017),
https://medium.com/@lhartikk/a-blockchain-in-200-lines-of-code-963cc1cc0e54 [https://perma.cc/
5CLX-5CU4].
45. See, e.g., Bitcoin Primer, FIDELITY (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.fidelity.com/
viewpoints/active-investor/beyond-Bitcoin [https://perma.cc/JH27-988G].
46. NAKAMOTO, supra note 5, at 1. For a popular historical account of Bitcoin’s
development, see generally POPPER, supra note 35.
47. Nakamoto uses the phrasing “electronic cash” to describe Bitcoin. NAKAMOTO,
supra note 5, at 1.
48. Id. This Comment addresses only public blockchains. Recently, private
blockchains operating within a “permissioned network” have become an option for those
wishing to employ the technology. Praveen Jayachandran, The Difference Between Public
and Private Blockchain, IBM (May 31, 2017), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/
2017/05/the-difference-between-public-and-private-blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/UH5A7BKX]. While the permissioned network might add another layer of security and privacy,
the underlying blockchain technology remains the same and thus does not alter the
discussion here. Id.
49. This discussion assumes some familiarity with Bitcoin protocol and focuses on the
most critical aspects of the technology for current purposes. For a more detailed
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A. How to Create, Transact, and Store Bitcoin
Public key cryptography—a way of using source code to securely
transfer information—is far from new. The idea first appeared in a
white paper in the mid-1970s,50 but it was not until the advent of
Bitcoin that it received broad public attention. To help communicate
a complicated topic to the uninitiated, the early Bitcoin advocates
personified math’s use of “A” and “B” in proofs by creating Alice
and Bob.51 In the spirit of that convention, this Comment will assume
the following transaction: Alice sends Bob five Bitcoin.
Before explaining how the transaction occurs, it is instructive to
examine where the transaction takes place. Bitcoin transactions occur
within the Bitcoin network. The network is “peer-to-peer,” meaning
that the computer servers, commonly called “nodes,” that actively run
the Bitcoin’s open-source software are linked together.52 Since the
blockchain protocol is open-source, anyone with an internet
connection can download and run it on their server.53 So long as a
node is actively running the software program, it is connected to the
other nodes on the network. Skipping ahead in the process, peer-topeer connection allows Alice and Bob to broadcast their completed
transaction to all other active nodes.54 It is within this network that
transactions are eventually confirmed and recorded on the

introduction to the technology, see generally ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN AND
CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION (2016). For a
popular account of the technology’s history and some of its key players, see generally
POPPER, supra note 35.
50. See generally Whitfield Diffie & Martin E. Hellman, New Directions in
Cryptography, 22 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. THEORY 644 (1976).
51. See POPPER, supra note 35, at 9, 11. For an example demonstrating that the
convention of using “Alice” and “Bob” as hypothetical transactors continues in the
Bitcoin community, see generally Brian Hayes, Alice and Bob in Cipherspace, AM.
SCIENTIST, Sept.–Oct. 2012, at 362, https://www.americanscientist.org/article/alice-and-bobin-cipherspace [https://perma.cc/K9J4-BPK5].
52. See NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 66–67. For a brief explanation of the
different kinds of nodes within the Bitcoin network, a topic outside the scope of this
Comment, see GHASSAN KARAME & ELLI ANDROULAKI, BITCOIN AND BLOCKCHAIN
SECURITY 48–49 (2016).
53. FRANCO, supra note 3, at 6.
54. KARAME & ANDROULAKI, supra note 52, at 49–51. Recently, given strong
incentives to operate quickly, some developers have created alternative networks that
interface with the Bitcoin network solely for speedier transmission of transaction
information. See id. at 52.
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blockchain.55 The nodes effectively act as managers of the blockchain
by running the Bitcoin protocol software.56
Transactions involving blockchain protocol involve a sender and
a recipient who both rely on cryptography for security and privacy.57
The first step in completing a transaction can occur offline; that is,
without access or use of the Bitcoin protocol or the internet.58 To
begin, Alice first generates a public key using the Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm.59 The public key will be, unsurprisingly,
publicly available but void of direct links to Alice’s identity. The
public key is then “hashed” to create Alice’s public address, which
serves as her identifier to others on the Bitcoin network.60 This public
address itself, however, does not reveal any personally identifiable
information about Alice.61 Thus, Alice has anonymity to a point,
though there are a number of ways that a public address may tip off
others about the identity of the sender.62
Alice also generates a private key known only to her.63 While still
offline,64 Alice creates her message—“send Bob five Bitcoin”—and
signs it with her private key. The algorithmic combination of Alice’s
message and private key creates her digital signature.65 The message
consists of outputs (the five Bitcoin) that she previously received in

55. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 66–67.
56. See Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero
Member LLC, NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 257, 258, 261 (2014) [hereinafter Bayern, Of
Bitcoins].
57. For a broader discussion of cryptography used in Bitcoin transactions, see
FRANCO, supra note 3, at 51–75. See also Bayern, Of Bitcoins, supra note 56, at 1–27.
58. See POPPER, supra note 35, at 358.
59. Id. at 17–18. The algorithm, initially created by the U.S. government, makes it
statistically improbable for an “attacker”—defined as someone interested in discovering
and using your private key—to discover the private key through randomized guesses. See
id. at 15–18. For a more detailed explanation of the algorithm, see FRANCO, supra note 3,
at 62–71.
60. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 18–19. While the public key is, in some
sense, an identifier in that the sender’s public key is required for the recipient of the
transaction to verify it as valid, the recipient cannot determine the sender by the public
key alone. See FRANCO, supra note 3, at 57.
61. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 19–20. As a practical matter, any user may
have as many addresses as he desires—new pairs of public and private keys may be
created at any time—and many use this as one way of protecting their identity on the
blockchain. Id.
62. See id. at 143–51.
63. Id. at 18–20.
64. See POPPER, supra note 35, at 358.
65. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 15–19.
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another transaction.66 Alice then directs the outputs to Bob’s public
address67 and broadcasts the transaction to all nodes in the Bitcoin
network, requiring her to be online.68 The nodes can then verify that
the transaction is valid (i.e., the message was sent from a valid address
and contains Bitcoin not previously spent by the sender).69 If valid,
the transaction is then added to a block of recent transactions by
miners. Miners make up the group of nodes who actively pool all
transactions to broadcast to the network.70
This block of transactions is then added to a string of other
blocks previously created by miners—hence the name “blockchain.”71
Miners are the nodes that run the blockchain protocol.72 They decide
which transactions are included and verify the transactions as valid.73
Then, they receive an incentive to create new blocks for the
blockchain.74 The incentive comes in the form of a “block reward” to
the miner of a certain amount of Bitcoin.75 Since all nodes running the
protocol are gathering all transactions broadcast to the network, the
node that successfully solves a complicated math equation by
“hashing” all collected transactions earns the “block award.”76
The first block is referred to as the “genesis block,” and the
protocol dictates that the longest chain of blocks is the valid
blockchain77—that is, all transactions on the longest chain are deemed

66. This is true even if the sender is herself a miner—in that case, the outputs are
received in the form of a block reward, as opposed to receiving the outputs from a prior
transaction. See id. at 38–41.
67. FRANCO, supra note 3, at 57. This assumes, of course, that the recipient has also
generated a public and private key. As of this writing, the operation of generating keys is
the same for both sender and recipient.
68. Id. at 112; NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 29.
69. FRANCO, supra note 3, at 78–79.
70. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 105.
71. FRANCO, supra note 3, at 105.
72. Id. at 105–06.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 39. The block reward started at fifty
Bitcoin and is set to decrease, per Bitcoin protocol, by half for every 210,000 blocks
created. Id. For the current number of blocks, which is 555,955 as of December 28, 2018, at
3:00 p.m., requiring a current block reward of 12.5 Bitcoin, as well as the current block
reward, see BITCOINCHARTS, supra note 29. Transaction fees are the other incentive for
mining, and one that will become more important when the 21 million Bitcoin limit is
reached. See NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 39–40.
76. FRANCO, supra note 3, at 105–07.
77. Id. at 109.
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valid, and once recorded, are essentially irreversible.78 The
blockchain, then, contains the definitive record of transactions and
unspent outputs in the Bitcoin network. For ease of use, the record of
all unspent outputs within the Bitcoin protocol is kept in the unspent
transaction outputs cache (“UTXO”).79
These unspent outputs recorded on the UTXO are merely bits of
code existing within blocks on the blockchain.80 As mentioned
previously, Bitcoin is tied to a specific public address81 and can only
be accessed using the private key tied to the public address. That is, if
Alice wants to send Bob five Bitcoin, then (1) Alice must have five
Bitcoin from a previous transaction; (2) the Bitcoin are accessible to
Alice through use of Alice’s private key; and (3) the nodes must
verify that Alice has five Bitcoin by searching the UTXO.82 If it is
confirmed that Alice does indeed have five Bitcoin, then the
transaction is approved, and Bob’s public address is now associated
with the five Bitcoin.83 Thus, this illustrates the importance of the
private key.
Since the private key accesses all available Bitcoin associated
with the corresponding public address, users must protect their
private key, and most choose to store keys in online exchanges.84 The
exchange acts as a place where users can keep Bitcoin, exchange
Bitcoin for fiat currency, and easily make Bitcoin transactions.85
Others may store them in some form of digital wallet software.86 This

78. Id. at 107–08; see also Böhme et al., supra note 43, at 219. For a discussion showing
that this irreversible nature was Satoshi Nakamoto’s original intent, see NAKAMOTO,
supra note 5, at 1.
79. FRANCO, supra note 3, at 79–80.
80. This point is crucially important to properly define Bitcoin. See infra Part II.
81. See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text.
82. See FRANCO, supra note 3, at 78–79. This example oversimplifies the process,
retaining—without diluting—the points that are essential to our discussion here. For a full
discussion of the transaction process, see id. at 77–93.
83. See id. at 78–79. This example oversimplifies the process, retaining, without
diluting, the points that are essential to our discussion here. For a full discussion of the
transaction process, see id. at 77–93.
84. See Mark, 12 Ways to Store Your Bitcoins, NULLTX (Mar. 1, 2017),
https://nulltx.com/12-ways-to-store-your-Bitcoins/ [http://perma.cc/NZ2P-CL3U].
85. See KARAME & ANDROULAKI, supra note 52, at 146.
86. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 88. There are a number of other ways that
private keys may be stored locally, see id. at 76–87, but most of the reported thefts have
occurred either from online exchanges or online wallet software. See Jeff John Roberts,
How Bitcoin Is Stolen: 5 Common Threats, FORTUNE (Dec. 8, 2017), http://fortune.com/
2017/12/08/Bitcoin-theft/ [https://perma.cc/3UD2-8EEC].

97 N.C. L. REV. 395 (2019)

2019]

CYBER PICKPOCKETS

407

allows users to store their keys in the cloud, where the keys can be
accessed by most devices with an internet connection.87
B.

How to Take Bitcoin

Before it is possible to confirm the recent headlines of Bitcoin
theft as true legal theft, it is important to examine the type of
interference concerning individual users’ private keys.88 One of the
more commonly reported thefts involves compromising an online
exchange. Exchanges continue to be the most common way for
individuals to transact in Bitcoin.89 Generally, the exchanges operate
“off-blockchain,” meaning that they operate on software unrelated to
the Bitcoin protocol.90 Individuals create accounts on the exchange,
much like bank accounts, where both cash and private keys can be
stored.91 The individual can then direct the exchange to use the cash
to make purchases of Bitcoin.92 In addition, many exchanges also
offer digital wallet services, permitting cloud-based storage for a
user’s private keys.93 The exchanges, then, tend to operate as a onestop shop, providing a forum for both purchasing and storing
Bitcoin.94
The most common form of theft from exchanges involves some
compromise of the exchange to gain access to exchange users’ private
keys stored in digital wallets on the exchange.95 Once the thief
accesses the private keys, he may transfer the Bitcoin associated with
87. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 88.
88. The scope of this Comment is restricted to this interference. There are, of course,
many other potential violations that might occur surrounding the interference at issue. See,
e.g., Former Secret Service Agent Pleads Guilty to Money Laundering, U.S. DEP’T JUST.
(Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-secret-service-agent-pleads-guiltymoney-laundering [https://perma.cc/D46P-UAT9].
89. Reuters, Cryptocurrency Exchanges Are Increasingly Roiled by Hackings and
Chaos, FORTUNE (Sept. 29, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/09/29/cryptocurrency-exchangeshackings-chaos/ [https://perma.cc/QEA6-NJ52].
90. FRANCO, supra note 3, at 42.
91. Id.
92. See KARAME & ANDROULAKI, supra note 52, at 146.
93. Id. at 146–49.
94. BITSTAMP, https://www.bitstamp.net [http://perma.cc/Z8M7-PUZM]; COINBASE,
https://www.coinbase.com/home [https://perma.cc/7FT9-JJJR]; Security, BITFINEX,
https://www.bitfinex.com/legal/security_policy [https://perma.cc/L3FT-CN5G].
95. See, e.g., McMillan, supra note 30. While outside the scope of this Comment, this
initial interference, commonly termed “hacking,” may be addressed by various state
statutes. Computer Crime Statutes, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/computer-hacking-and-unauthorizedaccess-laws.aspx#Hacking [https://perma.cc/S6W5-CBMC]. In addition, while it may be
difficult to prosecute theft under current federal provisions, this initial interference may be
addressed by the CFAA, discussed in Section III.B.2.
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each private key to his personal addresses.96 Nothing in the
transaction process, as demonstrated above, initially indicates to the
network that the transaction is not being made by the legitimate
owner of the compromised keys—to other nodes on the network, it
simply appears as if the user herself is completing a transaction. Since
the transactions initiated by the thief appear valid,97 they are also
likely to be verified on the network and incorporated into a valid
block. And, given that reversing these transactions is incredibly
difficult,98 the rightful owner of the private key is likely forever
deprived of the lost Bitcoin.
II. DEFINING BITCOIN
The well-worn notion of technology outpacing law99 is especially
apparent in early efforts to define Bitcoin. As one judge candidly
admits in a recent opinion, “[n]othing in our frame of references
allows us to accurately define or describe Bitcoin.”100 This reaction
may explain, in part, the early efforts by government agencies in this
regard. Many agencies seeking to define Bitcoin within existing
regulatory frameworks rely almost exclusively on the way the
cryptocurrency is used and fail to take on a more searching inquiry
into what Bitcoin is. This analysis does not align with the traditional
framework of the law of theft—for something to be an object of theft,
it must be a thing capable of being stolen. This part details early
efforts at defining Bitcoin by its use and proceeds to build on the
argument for the existence of individual property interests in Bitcoin.
A. Early Use Cases and Definitional Difficulties
Originally, Bitcoin was simply another effort to create a
workable system for digital cash. Satoshi Nakamoto, the original
96. See Mark, supra note 84. Technically, it is likely that the thefts will only
compromise the private keys in “hot storage,” that is, those that are stored on a system
that has internet access, by virtue of the fact that a thief with internet access can
theoretically gain access to the private keys; those in “cold storage,” on the other hand, are
offline. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 79. Many of the most popular exchanges
claim to store the vast majority of private key in cold storage. FRANCO, supra note 3, at 41.
This, however, can fluctuate—if demand for buying and selling increases, presumably
fewer private keys will remain in “cold storage.”
97. The transactions will involve the valid keys of the victim and valid keys of the
thief. See Mark, supra note 84.
98. KARAME & ANDROULAKI, supra note 52, at 146.
99. Vivek Wadhwa, Laws and Ethics Can’t Keep Pace with Technology, MIT TECH.
REV. (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/526401/laws-and-ethics-cantkeep-pace-with-technology/ [http://perma.cc/E48M-Y26U].
100. State v. Espinoza, No. F14-2923, slip op. at 5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 22, 2016).
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developer of blockchain protocol, largely built on the shoulders of the
so-called cypherphunks, the libertarian advocates for electronic cash
and other privacy-driven transactional methods who made the first
efforts in this regard.101 Early advocates strongly pushed for Bitcoin as
a “new global monetary system,”102 or a new form of cash, both as a
continuation of libertarian goals and as a way to attractively market
Bitcoin to the public. On a more practical level, many early
developers thought that Bitcoin must be valuable in order to
effectively incentivize miners to continue verifying transactions.103
Further, many of the early adopters of Bitcoin began to use it as
currency, albeit in most situations for the purchase of illegal goods.104
Over time, traditional sources of financial news also adopted the
language of Bitcoin as money or cryptocurrency.105 While some early
advocates are backing away from the idea of Bitcoin as money,106 this
perception continues to exist—a number of judges faced with early
cases involving Bitcoin unequivocally adopted the monetary
definition.107
Others in the Bitcoin, financial, and government communities
recently have shied away from defining Bitcoin as money and instead
have argued that it is better defined as a security. Recent guidance
distributed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)

101. See infra text accompanying notes 235–36.
102. Erik Voorhees, Bitcoin-The Libertarian Introduction, MONEY & ST. (Apr. 13,
2012), http://moneyandstate.com/Bitcoin-libertarian-introduction-used-care/ [http://perma.cc/
MSQ6-5T2B].
103. See NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 47. In fact, Bitcoin’s first proponents
believed that the profit motive was the only way for the project to operate effectively. See
id. As mentioned above, however, this motivation is far less important today as
blockchain’s use cases continue to expand.
104. See, e.g., Joshua Bearman, The Rise & Fall of the Silk Road: Part I, WIRED (May
2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/04/silk-road-1/ [https://perma.cc/Q8SY-JU39 (dark
archive)].
105. Rob Copeland, Peter Thiel’s Founders Fund Makes Monster Bet on Bitcoin, WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/peter-thiels-founders-fund-makes-bigbet-on-Bitcoin-1514917433/ [http://perma.cc/4BVG-UNEP].
106. See Erik Voorhees, The Importance of Bitcoin Not Being Money, MONEY & ST.
(Aug. 8, 2016), http://moneyandstate.com/the-importance-of-Bitcoin-not-being-money/
[https://perma.cc/E3RW-ARHC] (clarifying his early position of Bitcoin as “the best
money mankind had ever seen” by proposing, instead, that “Bitcoin isn’t money after
all”).
107. See State v. Espinoza, No. F14-2923, slip op. at 5–6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 22, 2016)
(“Nothing in our frame of references allows us to accurately define or describe Bitcoin.”).
But see United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 545 (2014) (holding that “Bitcoin
clearly qualifies as ‘money’” under 18 U.S.C. § 1960); SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416,
2013 WL 4028182, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013) (finding, in dicta, that “Bitcoin is a
currency or form of money”).
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states that “virtual coins or tokens . . . disseminated using distributed
ledger or blockchain technology . . . may be securities . . . subject to
the federal securities laws.”108 In addition, some foreign governments
are taking similar steps to recognize Bitcoin as a security.109 Both the
SEC guidance and foreign government action seem to be mere
extensions of the legal debate along the same lines.110 Some in the
tech community are taking up the argument as well.111
Many Bitcoin advocates and financial observers, however,
believe that, despite its security-like use by some individuals, inaction
by the SEC likely dooms this definition.112 This may not be the case
for blockchain-based cryptocurrencies other than Bitcoin—the SEC,
for instance, specifically targets initial coin offerings.113 But the
conclusion that Bitcoin is, in all circumstances, a security appears far
from settled in the courts. While courts may in theory have the
authority to broaden the definition of security through statutory
interpretation,114 many seem hesitant to do so.115 The SEC guidance,
108. Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(July 25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/ib_coinofferings/
[http://perma.cc/WA42-F483].
109. Angelica Ballesteros, Regulators Eye Wider Virtual Currency Use, MANILA TIMES
(Nov. 22, 2017), http://www.manilatimes.net/regulators-eye-wider-virtual-currency-use/364344/
[http://perma.cc/42BN-RUJ5].
110. See, e.g., Burks, supra note 20, at 246; Dan Stroh, Article, Secure Currency or
Security? The SEC and Bitcoin Regulation, U. CIN. L. REV. (Nov. 18, 2014),
https://uclawreview.org/2014/11/18/secure-currency-or-security-the-sec-and-Bitcoin-regulation/
[http://perma.cc/KF6B-LSG8].
111. See, e.g., Mario Lattuga, Yes, Bitcoin Will Be Regulated by the SEC. Here’s Why:,
MEDIUM (Dec. 3, 2017), https://medium.com/@mlattuga1/yes-Bitcoin-is-probably-a-securityheres-why-4f6410d9787c/ [http://perma.cc/L99C-GK9S].
112. See PETER VAN VALKENBURG, COIN CTR., FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITIES
REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCIES 50–54 (2016), https://coincenter.org/wpcontent/
uploads/2016/01/SECFramework2.5.pdf/ [http://perma.cc/5349-5DE8]. Another knowledgeable
author on the subject rightly notes that “if [the SEC] thought Bitcoin was a security, [it]
would probably have done something about it by now.” See Matt Levine, SEC Halts a
Real Initial Coin Offering, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Dec. 12, 2017, 3:20 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-12-12/sec-halts-a-real-initial-coin-offering#
footnote-1513099636855/ [https://perma.cc/HC42-PR5A (dark archive)].
113. Id. For a brief primer on the concept of Initial Coin Offerings, see Gregory J.
Nowak & Joseph C. Guagliardo, Blockchain and Initial Coin Offerings: SEC Provides
First U.S. Securities Law Guidance, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE FIN. REG.
(Aug. 9, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/08/09/blockchain-and-initial-coin-offeringssec-provides-first-u-s-securities-law-guidance/ [http://perma.cc/YX8Q-DMLN].
114. Steven J. Cleveland, Resurrecting Court Deference to the Securities and Exchange
Commission: Definition of “Security,” 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 273, 300–01 (2013).
115. See, e.g., SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-cv-416, 2013 WL 4028182, at *1–2 (E.D. Tex.
Aug. 6, 2013). While the court did not specifically hold that Bitcoin itself is a security
under the Securities Acts, it did hold that investments in a company that bought and sold
Bitcoin are considered securities. Id. at *2. Specifically in the criminal context, courts
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often a reliable source of interpretive help for the courts,116 does not
offer much clarity since its language—that Bitcoin and other virtual
currencies may be securities—leaves ample room for disagreement.
Still other government actions focus on Bitcoin’s myriad of other
uses to situate it neatly within their respective regulatory frameworks.
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FINCEN”) considers
those dealing in Bitcoin to be “money transmitters” and recently
brought actions against certain exchanges for alleged money
laundering.117 This action implicitly acknowledges monetary
properties in Bitcoin. Other agency actions mirror this trend. The
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), without defining the term
explicitly, equates Bitcoin to “real currency” and thus subjects income
in Bitcoin to taxation.118 The Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (“CFTC”), on the other hand, considers Bitcoin to be a
commodity, and its regulatory action similarly reflects this
disposition.119 While the list is long and varied, a unifying strand runs
through each effort at definition—the focus is constrained to Bitcoin’s
use, and no further. That is not to say that this definition is without
value. At the same time, however, it side-steps the important inquiry
into what Bitcoin is.
B.

The Case for Property Interests in Bitcoin

The technical description of Bitcoin leads to an intuitive
assumption that individuals have intangible property interests in it—

consistently rely on the rule of lenity to avoid broadening criminal statutes beyond the
boundaries delineated by Congress. See, e.g., United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 82
(2d Cir. 2012) (finding that, under 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a), a high frequency trading system of
a global bank, relatively new technology first implemented around the time of the
decision, was not “‘produced for’ nor ‘placed in’ interstate or foreign commerce” within
the meaning of the statute).
116. See Cleveland, supra note 114, at 301.
117. FinCEN Fines BTC-e Virtual Currency Exchange $110 Million for Facilitating
Ransomware, Dark Net Drug Sales, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (July 27,
2017), https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-fines-btc-e-virtual-currency-exchange110-million-facilitating-ransomware/ [http://perma.cc/6QZ9-2YPL]; see also FIN. CRIMES
ENF’T NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2014-R011, REQUEST FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE RULING ON THE APPLICATION OF FINCEN'S REGULATIONS TO A
VIRTUAL CURRENCY TRADING PLATFORM 1 (2014), http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/
rp/rulings/pdf/FIN-2014-R011.pdf [http://perma.cc/HL78-LDHQ].
118. I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938.
119. CFTC Orders Bitcoin Options Trading Platform Operator and Its CEO to Cease
Illegally Offering Bitcoin Options and to Cease Operating a Facility for Trading or
Processing of Swaps Without Registering, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMMISSION (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7231-15
[http://perma.cc/R5GT-V5WU].
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that it is something capable of being owned to the exclusion of the
whole world. As discussed above, Bitcoin is, by its nature, intangible.
It is nothing other than electronic data, a string of “bits” hosted on
software without any physical existence. And the holder of the private
key is the only individual who may access, transact, or transfer the
associated Bitcoin. Concluding that Bitcoin is legally the object of
theft requires, however, more than a bare assumption. This is critical
for purposes of the theft analysis—for something to be impermissibly
taken, it must first be owned exclusively.
“The act of stealing—of unlawfully treating tuum as meum” is
necessarily predicated on the idea that what is yours, which I treat as
mine, is actually yours.120 Naturally, this seems to imply principles of
ownership and thus property interests.121 To address theft of Bitcoin,
then, someone who claims rights of ownership in Bitcoin must, in fact,
have those rights in the first place.122
The Supreme Court has not found property interests to stem
from the Constitution;123 rather, the Court looks to “existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law” to define when a person has an interest in property.124 States are
varied in their approach to intangible interests in property. North
Carolina property law, for example, is unclear as to whether
intangible property rights exist, at least insofar as it pertains to
conversion claims.125 To bring a conversion action in North Carolina,
a plaintiff must show “ownership [of goods or personal chattels] . . .
and a wrongful conversion by defendant.”126 Intangible interests “such
120. See GREEN, supra note 22, at 1.
121. See Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud, supra note 38, at 684. The Supreme Court has
noted that “property is a creation of the law” and “the law limits rights of property
according to the public interest and when public policy demands it.” Id. at 695.
122. See id. In fact, whether the intangible item is property continues to be a central
issue in cases concerning theft of the item. See id. at 696.
123. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005).
124. Id. Some argue that this approach “leads to the confusing possibility of fifty
different versions” of property interests under federal provisions, and, thus, the federal
courts should be hesitant to use state law in defining property under federal statutes. See
Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud, supra note 38, at 715–16. The plain language of the Court,
however, does not seem to constrain the use of state law, despite this cautionary note. Id.
125. See Spinks v. Taylor, 303 N.C. 256, 264, 278 S.E.2d 501, 506 (1981) (defining
conversion as “an authorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over
goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the
exclusion of an owner’s rights” (quoting Peed v. Burleson, Inc., 244 N.C. 437, 439, 94
S.E.2d 351, 353 (1956))).
126. See Gallimore v. Sink, 27 N.C. App. 65, 67, 218 S.E.2d 181, 183 (1975) (citing Wall
v. Colvard, Inc., 268 N.C. 43, 49, 149 S.E.2d 559, 564 (1966); and then citing Vinson v.
Knight, 137 N.C. 408, 408, 49 S.E. 891, 892 (1905)).
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as business opportunities and expectancy interests” are not goods or
personal chattels and thus are not “owned” for purposes of
conversion.127 This finding seems to hinge on whether or not the
property interest is “reduced to tangible form.”128 This makes sense—
courts appear to be worried about overextending property
protections to items too ethereal to adequately define. But it may also
be attributed to the historical lack of intangible goods that one could
reasonably claim ownership over.
At the same time, however, when reading the Court’s language
closely, state law is but one of many sources that may be persuasive in
determining property rights. North Carolina law, and other states for
that matter, may not have the definitive last word. To this end, federal
court decisions have not constrained the analysis of intangible rights
to state law choices. Continuing with North Carolina as an example in
this regard, one federal district court has held that, “as a matter of
law, electronic data and computer software is intangible property.”129
Kremen v. Cohen,130 a recent decision in the Ninth Circuit, further
broadens, if only incrementally, the test for determining intangible
property rights. There, the Court held that an intangible good is a
property interest if it meets three requirements: (1) the interest must
be “capable of precise definition,” (2) “it must be capable of exclusive
possession and control,” and (3) some individual must be able to
make a “legitimate claim” of ownership.131 Both examples, at the very
least, unmoor the concept of individual property rights from
tangibility and thus open the door for recognition of property
interests in Bitcoin.
Other sources of law and government agency actions further
indicate a shift in recognizing intangible property interests. Black’s
Law Dictionary, for instance, seems amenable to defining Bitcoin as
property.132 Bitcoin, anecdotally, is pledged as collateral in

127. Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons’ Farms, Inc., 140 N.C. App. 390, 414, 537 S.E.2d
248, 264 (2000).
128. HCW Ret. & Fin. Servs. LLC v. HCW Emp. Benefit Servs. LLC, No. 10 CVS
1447, 2015 WL 4238193, at *21 (N.C. Bus. Ct. July 14, 2015).
129. See Capitol Comm’n Inc. v. Capitol Ministries, 2013 WL 5493013, at *12
(E.D.N.C. 2013) (citing Am. Online Inc., v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 347 F.3d 89, 96 (4th
Cir. 2003)).
130. 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003).
131. Id. at 1030 (quoting G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc.,
958 F.2d 896, 903 (9th Cir. 1992).
132. Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Intangible
Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Property that lacks a physical
existence.”); see, e.g., James D. Lamm et al., The Digital Death Conundrum: How Federal
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compliance with Uniform Commercial Code Article 9, and the
Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act from the Uniform
Law Commission folds Bitcoin into trust and estates law.133
Furthermore, actions and statements of other government agencies
seem to support this definition. The actions of the SEC, FINCEN,
and the CFTC indicate recognition of individual interests in Bitcoin—
whether a security, money, or a commodity (if it happens to be any),
ownership must be attributable to an individual.134 The IRS, although
limiting the definition to “federal tax purposes,” explicitly labels
Bitcoin and other virtual currency as property.135 Additionally,
Bitcoin is subject to both civil and criminal forfeiture, as evidenced by
the U.S. Marshals Service’s recent auctions.136
The multiplicity of sources above suggests that many areas of the
law are amenable to Bitcoin’s definition as intangible personal
property. As a result, Bitcoin easily satisfies the Ninth Circuit’s threepart test. Returning to the example above, Bob’s interest definitively
lies in the outputs associated with his public address. And the outputs
(Bitcoin) are capable of precise definition—each output is a specific,
unique line of code. Further, Bitcoin is, by nature, exclusively held
and controlled because Bob controls his own private key. Bob’s
interest in Bitcoin would be diminished, if not extinguished, if it were
not capable of exclusive control. And the blockchain ledger
announces to “all the world” that the Bitcoin belongs to Bob, and he,
as exclusive holder of the private key, is the only person who can
make a legitimate claim to the Bitcoin.137 As indicated above, other
and State Laws Prevent Fiduciaries from Managing Digital Property, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV.
385, 388 (2014).
133. J. Dax Hansen & Joshua L. Boehm, Treatment of Bitcoin Under U.S. Property
Law, PERKINS COIE 11–14 (Mar. 2017), https://www.virtualcurrencyreport.com/wp-content/
uploads/sites/13/2017/03/2016_ALL_Property-Law-Bitcoin_onesheet.pdf
[http://perma.cc/
N6RF-RLV9]; Nate Lanxon, Bitcoin Industry Grapples with Age-Old Problem of
Inheritance, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 13, 2018, 5:09 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-02-13/bitcoin-industry-grapples-with-age-old-problem-of-inheritance
[http://perma.cc/YQ3W-MX8G (dark archive)].
134. See supra text accompanying notes 118–20.
135. See I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938.
136. FOR
SALE
2,719.32669068
Bitcoins,
U.S.
MARSHALS
SERV.,
https://www.usmarshals.gov/assets/2016/Bitcoinauction/ [http://perma.cc/3GXF-6DY8].
137. It is important to mention here the problem of double-spending. It is sufficient for
the purpose of this Comment to note that Bitcoin protocol generally prevents (again,
relying on the earlier example) Alice from sending five Bitcoin to Bob, then proceeding to
send the same five Bitcoin to Carl. For a more detailed explanation of the double-spend
problem, see FRANCO, supra note 3, at 113–17. In addition, while this analysis serves the
purposes here, others have analyzed this Ninth Circuit test in more detail. See Hansen &
Boehm, supra note 133, at 7–8.
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legal entities are prepared, or have already taken a definitive step, to
recognize this interest. The weight of evidence to date, then, strongly
indicates the existence of intangible property interests in Bitcoin.
If an ownership interest does exist in Bitcoin, as the above
analysis suggests,138 the question remains as to when the holder of the
interest can claim that interest “against the world.” To this end, it is
important to briefly consider when the interest in ownership of
Bitcoin might vest; that is, when the right is “completed . . . for
present enjoyment.”139 Once the interest vests, a deprivation of that
interest—here, a total loss of possession and use—is the point at
which theft occurs.140 Again applying these concepts to the
hypothetical transaction in this Comment, once Alice’s transaction to
Bob is confirmed and included in a valid block, Bob’s interest in the
five Bitcoin vests. At that point, the right is “completed” in that the
five Bitcoin are attributable to Bob, and only Bob’s private key can
facilitate use of the Bitcoin transferred to him.141 Therefore, theft
occurs when someone other than Bob takes control of Bob’s private
key and completes a transfer to another public address.
III. APPLYING THE LAW OF THEFT
Proceeding on the assumption that individuals possess intangible
property interests in Bitcoin, its owner then must be afforded the
“right against interference with possession from the world at large.”142
And this right necessarily implicates the law of theft—punishment for
violating that right is critical to both deterrence and public confidence
in its protection. To this end, the Model Penal Code has defined the
proper object of theft as “anything of value,” including “intangible
personal property,”143 seemingly in an effort to broaden the
138. See Shawn Bayern, Dynamic Common Law and Technological Change: The
Classification of Bitcoin, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 22, 33–34 (2014) [hereinafter
Bayern, Dynamic Common Law] (arguing for a functional approach to recognize rights of
property in Bitcoin to match what individual holders already assume they own).
139. Vested, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
140. See Tigar, supra note 25, at 1448.
141. See Hansen & Boehm, supra note 133, at 9.
142. Bayern, Dynamic Common Law, supra note 138, at 31. Black’s Law Dictionary
includes as rights of an owner of property the “right to possess and use, the right to
exclude, and the right to transfer.” Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
143. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.0 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (defining “property” for
purposes of the provisions concerning theft as “anything of value” that includes items of
“intangible personal property”). It is also interesting to note that this definition appears to
stem from the Model Penal Code’s choice to favor elimination of the common law
distinctions between types of theft, consolidating the offense to a single crime that covers a
broad array of interests. See Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud, supra note 38, at 687–88.
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protections of the criminal law. The critical question, however, is not
whether intangible property rights are objects of theft in the abstract;
it is rather “whether the victim’s loss constituted property for
purposes of the statute being considered.”144
Two statutes, the NSPA and the CFAA, appear at first glance to
provide potential solutions. Both statutes were enacted in response to
pervasive issues of theft that created difficulties for state law
enforcement. The NSPA sought to confront the problem of thieves
escaping over state lines,145 while the CFAA focused on theft by
hacking that arose with the escalating use of computers.146 By
analyzing their application, courts may find adequate justification to
extend the statutes to encompass Bitcoin theft. At the very least, this
discussion should provide lawmakers with the necessary bases to
amend the statutes to accommodate this new form of taking.
The strongest argument, and the statute most apt to deal with
Bitcoin theft, is 18 U.S.C. § 1343, the Federal Wire Fraud statute.
Long a favorite of federal prosecutors, the statute appears to be the
perfect tool, from both a policy and legal perspective, to combat
Bitcoin theft. The following discussion lays out the argument that
must be made in this regard and will provide a roadmap for
prosecution of theft of any blockchain-based crypto-asset.
A. The National Stolen Property Act
Enacted in 1934, the NSPA bars the “transport[], transmi[ssion],
or transfer[] in interstate or foreign commerce [of] any goods, wares,
merchandise, securities, or money, of the value of $5000 or more,
knowing the same to have been stolen, converted, or taken by
fraud.”147 When interpreting this statute, courts will find a violation of
the statute if an individual “(1) transports or causes to be transported;
(2) in interstate commerce; (3) [goods, wares, merchandise, securities,
or money] valued at $5,000 or more; (4) with knowledge that the
property has been stolen, converted, or fraudulently taken from its
rightful owner.”148 The NSPA, however, treats only the symptom and
not the disease—only transporting stolen goods, not the theft of those
goods, is prohibited. At the same time, it is an effective tool for

144. Id. at 686.
145. Id. at 697.
146. Note, The Vagaries of Vagueness: Rethinking the CFAA as a Problem of Private
Nondelegation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 751, 751 (2013).
147. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2012).
148. Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud, supra note 38, at 697–98.
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deterrence of theft.149 But a key issue in applying the NSPA to Bitcoin
theft lies in the courts’ uncertain treatment of intangible property.
This problem, however, can be overcome.
Courts often conflate the first two elements and simply ask
whether the item was transferred through interstate commerce.
Generally speaking, the Supreme Court has historically construed
“interstate commerce” broadly.150 Lower courts, however, appear
divided as to whether, for the purpose of criminal statutes, the term
encompasses internet transmissions of intangible items of property.
Some require a showing that the internet transmission itself did in fact
cross state lines—that is, an intangible item was transmitted from a
server in one state to a server in another.151 Other courts merely
require a showing that the transmission used the internet.152 In other
criminal statutes, Congress specifically defines use of the internet as
within “interstate commerce,” but it has not amended the NSPA to
that effect.153
Unfortunately, Congress left “goods, wares merchandise,
securities or money” undefined without explanation.154 In response,
courts often rely on various common law methods to interpret these
terms.155 Generally, courts have found that some “physical identity
between the property stolen and property transported” must be
present.156 This holding appears to hinge on depriving the owner of
use—physical takings, by necessity, accomplish this. To this end, the
Supreme Court found the NSPA inapplicable to theft of copyright,
basing this holding primarily on the fact that copyright infringement

149. See id. at 697.
150. See McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 652–54 (1982).
151. See generally Valeria G. Luster, Note, Let’s Reinvent the Wheel: The Internet as a
Means of Interstate Commerce in United States v. Kieffer, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 589 (2015)
(discussing at length the split between federal courts). The Supreme Court has not stepped
in to resolve this divide and the many other issues presented with use of the internet in
criminal statutes. Id. at 590.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 596–97.
154. United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 2012); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 1312 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/usam/
criminal-resource-manual-1312-national-stolen-property-act-goods-wares-merchandise
[https://perma.cc/5JLK-XGWN].
155. See Tamara J. Wayland, Note, Computer Technology—The National Stolen
Property Act and its Applicability to Property Rights in Computer Source Code—Do Rights
Exist?—United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1991), 11 TEMP. ENVTL. L. &
TECH. J. 155, 161 (1992).
156. Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud, supra note 38, at 698; see also Aleynikov, 676 F.3d
at 77.
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does not totally deprive the holder of use.157 In addition, other lower
courts have held that the NSPA does not cover “purely intangible
property” that lacks any physical element.158 Courts premise the
“physical taking” holding on the fact that such a physical taking
clearly deprives the rightful owner of use, often completely.159 In each
of the above cited cases, however, theft of intangible property did not
lead to complete deprivation of use.160
Therefore, this statute will not apply to the act of taking an
individual’s private key.161 It, however, likely covers the unlawful
transfer of Bitcoin from the rightful owner to the thief’s public
address.162 Bitcoin transactions occur on the Bitcoin network; an
internet connection plus the proper software are required.163 The
transmission of Bitcoin over the Bitcoin network remains
substantially unaddressed by Congress and courts—Congress’s silence
in this regard remains unhelpful. It may be argued, then, that
Supreme Court precedent dictates a broad reading of the interstate
commerce element in the NSPA—this transfer, if accomplished via
the internet, occurs in interstate commerce. In addition, technological
properties of the Bitcoin network allow for an easy inference that,
since the transaction is broadcast to all nodes on the network, and it is
verifiable that operating nodes exist in more than one state, the
transmission crossed state lines.164
The central difficulty in prosecuting Bitcoin theft under the
NSPA largely resides in classifying Bitcoin as a “good, ware, or
merchandise.” Courts recognize that the statute, crafted in the 1930s,

157. Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 215–16 (1985); Moohr, Federal Criminal
Fraud, supra note 38, at 699.
158. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 77.
159. Id. at 78–79. In Aleynikov, the defendant was accused of stealing his employer’s
source code, uploading it to a server in one place, and downloading it in another.
Crucially, the employer did not lose access to the source code; rather, the defendant
merely gained access to a proprietary code that would be valuable to competitors. Id. at
73–75.
160. See United States v. Agrawal, 726 F.3d 235, 237–39 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v.
Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 6–10, 13–15 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109,
1111–12, 1114–15 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301, 1305–08 (10th
Cir. 1991).
161. See Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud, supra note 38, at 697 n.88 (noting that
“refinements of larceny are not related to the primary congressional purpose of the Act”).
162. As mentioned above, this transfer requires the use of the rightful owner’s private
key—other nodes will not verify the transaction unless the hash of the user’s private key
and the message containing Bitcoin are confirmed. See supra Section I.A.
163. See id.
164. See United States v. Kieffer, 681 F.3d 1143, 1154–55 (10th Cir. 2012).
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does not comport with modern realities and creates ambiguities.165
Courts, however, seem reluctant to stray from the “physical taking”
requirement until Congress says otherwise.166
At the same time, in spite of the lack of a physical element, the
theft of Bitcoin differs from other takings of intangible property in
one critical aspect—once a user’s private key is stolen, this completely
deprives the user of its use, and any subsequent transaction involving
Bitcoin tied to the user’s private key is irreversible.167 Thus, Bitcoin
theft more closely mirrors the taking of a physical item—both owners
are completely deprived of use of the thing—as opposed to business
information or other forms of intangible property that courts have
thus far been reluctant to recognize.
B.

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

Another statute that may provide a basis for criminal
prosecution for theft of Bitcoin is the CFAA.168 Originally enacted in
the 1980s, the CFAA initially targeted improper access of
government computers.169 Congress subsequently amended the
CFAA five times to meet the growing number of criminal actions
related to the increased use of computers by the general public.170 To
this end, the statute is typically applied in cases of “computer
intrusion or hacking.”171 The CFAA now provides for forfeiture of
“any property, real or personal,” gained by violation of the Act,
providing compensatory relief to victims of the fraud proscribed.172

165. See United States v. Zhang, 995 F. Supp. 2d 340, 348–49 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
166. See United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 78–79 (2d Cir. 2012).
167. See supra Section I.B. Additionally, one district court noted in dicta that “courts
have liberally construed” the terms to cover “personal property and chattels that are
ordinarily the subject of commerce,” and courts may “unduly restrict” the operation of the
NSPA by requiring a physical taking. United States v. Riggs, 739 F. Supp. 414, 421 (N.D.
Ill. 1990). This interpretation, coupled with the complete deprivation of use involved in
Bitcoin theft, may be enough to overcome the tangibility requirement in arguing NSPA’s
application to theft of Bitcoin.
168. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
169. H.R. REP. NO. 99-612, at 4 (1986).
170. See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94
MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1561 (2010) [hereinafter Kerr, Vagueness Challenges].
171. Tiffany Curtiss, Comment, Computer Fraud and Abuse Enforcement: Cruel,
Unusual, and Due for Reform, 81 WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1822 (2016).
172. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(i) (2012).
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1. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2): Accessing a Computer and Obtaining
Information
In relevant part, the provision defines as criminal any actor who
“intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds
authorized access, and thereby obtains . . . information from any
protected computer.”173 The Act fails to define the statute’s first term,
“intentional access of a computer.”174 Currently, however, courts do
not constrain the statute through this element.175 Rather, “any
internet-related transmission . . . that results in the user’s computer
‘accessing a series of networked computers’” will suffice.176 Similar to
“intentional access,” Congress gives no definition of “without
authorization or exceeds authorized access,” and courts have largely
not offered an interpretation.177 In light of this uncertainty, the courts
rely on the dictionary to define the term as “access . . . without
permission or approval.”178 Ostensibly, the one who controls access to
the information is the one who may grant, or deny, permission.179
Lastly, the statute fails to define “information.”180 But the report on
the 1996 amendments to § 1030(a)(2) offers guidance, specifically
designating “information stored in intangible form” as falling within
the statutory language.181 Further, obtaining such intangible
information is interpreted broadly and may be accomplished by
“merely reading it.”182
In contrast, Congress does define a “protected computer” as one
“which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.”183
Congress intended the use of “affect” in the definition to demonstrate
an intent for the provision to “reach as far as the Commerce Clause of

173. Id. § 1030(a)(2).
174. Patricia L. Bellia, A Code-Based Approach to Unauthorized Access Under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1442, 1464 (2016).
175. Id. at 1468.
176. Id. at 1465.
177. See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization”
in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1616–17 (2003) (noting that existing
interpretations of the term, when given, are often in conflict) [hereinafter Kerr,
Cybercrime’s Scope]; Kerr, Vagueness Challenges, supra note 170, at 1572 (noting
“[e]xactly what . . . makes an ‘access’ unauthorized[] is presently unclear”).
178. Bellia, supra note 174, at 1468–69.
179. See WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 2012).
The analysis gets more complicated, however, when an employee accesses the computer
systems of her employer. See Bellia, supra note 174, at 1469–71.
180. Czech v. Wall St. on Demand, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1108 (D. Minn. 2009).
181. S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 7 (1996).
182. Id.
183. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) (2012).
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the Constitution permits.”184 To this end, many courts have held that a
computer’s connection to the internet is sufficient to qualify it as a
“protected computer.”185 Some commenters, in support of this point,
make the inference that since all “internet-connected computer[s]
[are] used in interstate communication,” the computers are, by
nature, in interstate commerce for purposes of this section.186 Other
courts have relied on the connection between the computer that is
accessed and those who are interacting with its software, inferring
“interstate commerce” from such an interaction that crosses state
lines.187
Applied to theft of private keys, a forceful argument may be
made for prosecution under § 1030(a)(2). The thief necessarily must
intentionally use the internet to access the exchange’s stored private
keys; what remains is a showing that the exchange’s computers are
“networked.” Given the technical description of the Bitcoin network
above, this element is met with little difficulty—each node running
blockchain software is part of a network that is constantly receiving
transactions broadcast to it. And active nodes are spread out both
among multiple states and internationally.188 Showing “without
authorization” presents little difficulty as well: hackers, by common
definition,189 do not have permission to access the exchange’s
network,190 at least assuming that the online exchange has not given
the thief this permission.191 And Bitcoin outputs, as lines of code, are
most simply defined as “information.”192 Intangibility is of no

184. See Bellia, supra note 174, at 1643.
185. See, e.g., United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 457 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
186. See Bellia, supra note 174, at 1462.
187. See, e.g., Quantlab Techs. Ltd. v. Godlevsky, 719 F. Supp. 2d 766, 775–76 (S.D.
Tex. 2010).
188. Global Bitcoin Nodes Distribution, BITNODES, https://bitnodes.earn.com
[https://perma.cc/5VT4-DQ5P].
189. Hacker, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2005) (“[A] person who
illegally gains access to and sometimes tampers with information in a computer system.”).
The Black’s Law Dictionary definition, while using language that appears somewhat
outdated, is still applicable: “[s]omeone who surreptitiously uses or changes the
information in another’s computer system.” Hacker, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014).
190. It appears unlikely that the access would have to “circumvent[] a technological
access barrier” in order to be unauthorized. United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1024
(9th Cir. 2016).
191. The outcome may be different if the private keys were accessed by someone with
authorization to access the host’s exchange information, such as an employee of the
particular exchange. See Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, supra note 177, at 1632–37.
192. One common definition of “information” is “the attribute inherent in and
communicated by one of two or more alternative sequences or arrangements of something
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consequence—the amendment reports mentioned above support this
reading, and others forcefully put forward this argument.193 Lastly,
much like the NSPA, the “protected computer” element will depend
on the jurisdiction—one must show that the exchange was connected
to the internet or that the exchange’s users, those “interacting” with
the computer’s software, were located across state lines.
The difficulty with prosecution under this statute is its breadth,
attributable to both statutory amendments and court interpretation,
leaving prosecutions under the CFAA susceptible to vagueness
attacks. Orin Kerr has argued that this breadth requires courts to
engage in narrow statutory interpretation, which would appear to cast
doubt on the above analysis.194 As the doctrine stands, however,
§ 1030(a)(2) appears to provide a viable path for prosecution. At the
very least, such a prosecution may draw Congress’s attention to the
changing application of the statute and the need for more precise
definition of terms outpaced by technology.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4): Accessing to Defraud and Obtain Value
In relevant part, § 1030(a)(4) bars
knowingly and with intent to defraud, access[ing] a protected
computer without authorization . . . and by means of such
conduct further[ing] the intended fraud and obtain[ing]
anything of value, unless the object of the fraud and the thing
obtained consists only of the use of the computer and the value
of such use is not more than $5,000 in any one year period.195
“Knowingly and with intent to defraud” is not defined by statute, but
Senate and House reports discussing the CFAA refer to the phrase in
the context of its use in 18 U.S.C. § 1029.196 Under § 1029, prosecutors
must show “the property wrongfully obtained via computer furthers
the intended fraud” and knowledge by the defrauder of this fact.197
Fraud is “furthered” when the property obtained later is used to

(as . . . binary digits in a computer program) that produce specific effects.” Information,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2005).
193. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Bitproperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805, 807–12 (2015).
194. See Kerr, Vagueness Challenges, supra note 170, at 1561.
195. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2012).
196. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS 97-1025, CYBERCRIME: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE STATUTE AND RELATED
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 52 (2014).
197. S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 10 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2487–88.
The report notes that this distinction is crucial to treat the action under § 1030(a)(4) as a
felony and not merely as a misdemeanor. Id.
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commit the fraud intended.198 The meaning of “fraud,” however,
remains undefined, and the common-law development of the term is
unsettled.199 Some courts, in an apparent desire for uniformity of
meaning, equate fraud under § 1030(a)(4) to its use in the wire fraud
statute.200 This meaning, described below, is extraordinarily broad.
Other courts, addressing the same section in a civil context, interpret
the language more broadly to cover any “wrongdoing”201 that
deprives someone of a thing of value.202 Lastly, the “access of a
protected computer” and “authorization” elements track
§ 1030(a)(2).203
Returning to the prototypical theft described above, this statute
might apply with similar force as § 1030(a)(2). The mens rea
elements—knowledge and intent to commit fraud—are easily met.
Hackers, again by definition, are likely knowing participants who aim
to commit fraud. If fraud is given its civil meaning of “wrongdoing,”
depriving exchange users of private keys by hacking, a harm explicitly
targeted by the CFAA, almost certainly fits within the statutory
definition.204 Finally, the fraud is “furthered” under this definition
when the thief uses the private keys to transfer Bitcoin from the
rightful owner to a public address controlled by the thief.205
The likely challenge to prosecution under this statute is whether
Bitcoin meets the definition of “anything of value.” Whether Bitcoin
is “valuable,” in the sense of possessing intrinsic monetary value, is a
point of disagreement.206 But any item is “valuable” in that individuals
are willing to buy and sell it at a market price. This is arguably the
198. See COMPUT. CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, supra note 39, at 29.
199. Id. at 27–29.
200. See United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1079 (1st Cir. 1997) (“For the same
reasons we deemed the trial evidence could not support a finding that [the Defendant]
deprived the IRS of its property, . . . we find that [the Defendant] has not obtained
valuable information in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme for the purposes of section
1030(a)(4).”).
201. See COMPUT. CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, supra note 39, at 29.
202. DOYLE, supra note 196, at 52.
203. See supra Section III.B.1.
204. For the discussion of fraud under the wire fraud provision, see infra Section III.C.
205. For a recent example of this form of theft in action, see Nikhilesh De, $400K:
Hacker Makes Off with Stellar Lumens in BlackWallet Theft, COINDESK (Jan. 16, 2018,
1:39 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/400k-hacker-makes-off-with-stellar-lumens-in-blackwallettheft/ [http://perma.cc/9QEY-7MA4].
206. A prominent investor argues that the value of Bitcoin is “speculation” and not
based on “underlying value or the appropriateness of . . . price.” See Memorandum from
Howard Marks to Clients of Oaktree Capital Mgmt., L.P. 17 (July 26, 2017),
https://www.oaktreecapital.com/docs/default-source/memos/there-they-go-again-again.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZUK3-YTUU].
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most natural reading of the term “value” as used in the statute.
“Value” is not modified by either “intrinsic” or “monetary”; rather,
“anything” seems to imply a broad definitional standard of “value.” It
is clear, through news headlines and otherwise, that Bitcoin is bought
and sold daily for significant sums.207
Again, however, as with § 1030(a)(2) above, this broad language
may leave prosecutions under the statute susceptible to vagueness
challenges. But a similar proscriptive solution is apt here as well—
until Congress makes the choice to amend the statute, and so long as
courts interpret its language in the way described above, the path to
prosecution of Bitcoin theft is viable.
C.

18 U.S.C. § 1343: Wire Fraud

The mail fraud provision, § 1341, and its “sister provision”208
covering wire fraud, § 1343,209 have long been a favorite of federal
prosecutors.210 Section 1343 implicates those
having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits
or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or
television communication in interstate or foreign commerce,
any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose
of executing such scheme or artifice . . . .211
Because of courts’ historically broad interpretation of the statute, it
remains prosecutors’ “first line of defense against virtually every new
area of fraud to develop in the United States.”212 The statutes are
aimed at frauds concerning property, and both have their “origin in
207. See Markets, BITCOINCHARTS, https://Bitcoincharts.com/markets/ [http://perma.cc/
BB6J-7KFM].
208. See C.J. Williams, What Is the Gist of the Mail Fraud Statute?, 66 OKLA. L. REV.
287, 304, 320 (2014) (referring to the federal mail and wire fraud statutes as “sisters”).
209. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).
210. See Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771,
772 (1980). Judge Rakoff, writing at a time when he was Chief of Business Frauds
Prosecutions as a U.S. Attorney, opined that “[t]o federal prosecutors of white collar
crime, the mail fraud statute is our Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our
Cuisinart—and our true love.” Id. at 771.
211. § 1343.
212. Rakoff, supra note 210, at 772 (quoting United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405
(1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)). Prosecutors may be even more likely to utilize the
statutes following the 2002 amendments to both provisions that increased the maximum
sentencing for convicted defendants “from 5 to 20 years.” Jack E. Robinson, The Federal
Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes: Correct Standards for Determining Jurisdiction and Venue,
44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 479, 479–80 (2008).
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the desire to protect individual property rights.”213 Partly in
recognition of this underlying principle, and considering Congress’s
choice to use almost identical language in § 1343 as in § 1341, the
Court interprets this identical language “in pari materia.”214
Predictably, the elements of § 1343 mirror those of § 1341,215 reflecting
an intent by Congress to simply extend § 1341’s principles to frauds
committed using a new medium.216 The elements that must be met are
uncomplicated—the government must establish that the defendant
intended to carry out a scheme to defraud and used wires to further
that scheme.217 And if the government meets its burden, it establishes
a predicate offense to other potential criminal sanctions.218
The “schemes to defraud” included under § 1343 are, in the
words of some commentators, “too numerous to catalog.”219 Some
suggest that its theoretical limits stretch to encompass not only
213. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 (1987). This point is critical not only in
the context of Bitcoin but also in the wider discussion of property interests in other forms
information supported by blockchain protocols.
214. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 355 n.2 (2005). Lower courts have
noted that “interpreting one [provision] govern[s] the other as well.” United States v.
Morelli, 169 F.3d 798, 806 n.9 (3d Cir. 1999). In other words, case law applying one statute
equally applies to the other.
215. United States v. Frey, 42 F.3d 795, 797 (3d Cir. 1994). Most other circuit courts
have held similarly. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, TITLE 9
§ 941 (2018) (citing United States v. Briscoe, 65 F.3d 576, 583 (7th Cir. 1995); and then
citing Frey, 42 F.3d at 797), https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-941-18usc-1343-elements-wire-fraud [https://perma.cc/KEG8-T43J]. In addition, the Supreme
Court, since its decision in Carpenter, conducts the analysis of fraud under both statutes
similarly. See Debora Carfora, Note, United States v. Newark: Semantics and
Misrepresentation in Mail and Wire Fraud, Does it Really Matter Who Was Deceived?, 60
CATH. U. L. REV. 779, 780–81 (2011).
216. See H.R. REP. NO. 82-1750, at 22 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2234,
2256 (expanding to include “Fraud by Radio”).
217. E.g., United States v. Wynn, 684 F.3d 473, 478 (4th Cir. 2012) (“To be convicted of
mail fraud or wire fraud, a defendant must specifically intend to lie or cheat or
misrepresent with the design of depriving the victim of something of value.”). Turning to
the text of § 1343, it applies to those
having devised . . . any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises,
transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire . . . in interstate or foreign
commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice.
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012). In addition, the Supreme Court has indicated that federal
jurisdiction is established simply by interstate use of wires. See Neder v. United States, 527
U.S. 1, 20 (1999).
218. See Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 383 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). While beyond the
scope of this Comment, it bears reinforcing that prosecutors may pursue both RICO and
money laundering charges after establishing wire fraud. See id.
219. See Rakoff, supra note 210, at 772.
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common law conceptions of fraud220 but any scheme that involves
“intent to take property by deception,” far exceeding the common
law principles deeply rooted in the law of theft.221 In a few instances
where the Court sought to narrow the scope of objects subject to
fraud, Congress immediately responded with amendments to
encompass the objects recently excluded.222 At the very least, the
Supreme Court recognizes property interests—both tangible and
intangible223—as objects of fraudulent schemes.224 In addition, the
scheme may not, in fact, cause loss by the victim or benefit to the
fraudster, nor is this required; rather, the scheme to defraud simply
“must be material to the contemplated transaction.”225
The use of wires must also be interstate. Some courts require a
showing that the transmission by wire, in fact, crossed state lines.226
However, the same division that exists in application of the term in
the CFAA exists here—other courts merely require demonstrated use
of the internet to be interstate.227 In addition, the wire use must be in
furtherance of the scheme to defraud.228 The Court chooses to
interpret this element broadly and generally incorporates the analysis

220. It appears, at the very least, that the statute does incorporate the frauds
recognized at common law—since the term is not defined by statute, the Court will impute
the “established meaning of th[is] term[].” See Neder, 527 U.S. at 21–22 (quoting
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992)).
221. David Mills & Robert Weisburg, Corrupting the Harm Requirement in White
Collar Crime, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1394 (2008). The Court, elsewhere, seems to state as
much, noting that “to defraud” commonly means “wronging one in his property rights by
dishonest methods or schemes,” and that the words “usually signify the deprivation of
something of value by trick, deceit, chicane, or overreaching.” Hammerschmidt v. United
States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924).
222. Carfora, supra note 215, at 781.
223. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 (1987) (quoting McNally v. United
States, 483 U.S. 350, 359 n.8 (1987)).
224. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987), superseded by statute, Act of
Nov. 19, 1998, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (1988), as recognized in
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402 (2010).
225. Mills & Weisburg, supra note 221, at 1395 (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 25). Further,
the federal wire fraud statutes appear to divorce from the civil law in another respect, not
requiring “justifiable reliance” by the one defrauded for criminal culpability. Id. at 1394–
95. Nor does it encounter the value problem posed by the CFAA contemplated above. Id.
226. United States v. Kieffer, 681 F.3d 1143, 1155 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Wright, 625 F.3d 583, 595 (9th Cir. 2010).
227. Kieffer, 681 F.3d at 1153–55 (“This case, then, is the ‘typical case’ where ‘the
evidence of the interstate element can be gleaned from the record’ evidence . . . .” (quoting
United States v. Swenson, 335 F. App’x 751, 753–54 (10th Cir. 2009))); Wright, 625 F.3d at
595.
228. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).
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into the mens rea requirement.229 To that end, any use of wires not
required by law and intended to perpetrate fraud is enough to
establish furtherance of the fraud.230
Applied to Bitcoin theft, § 1343 requires the least “extension” of
statutory language and principles and, therefore, is the best path for
prosecution. It appears clear that the property interest at stake,
ownership of Bitcoin, is gained by deception in the prototypical theft.
This is most true when the exchange software is hacked, the user’s
private keys are compromised, and the thief completes an
unauthorized transaction. It is likely equally true when hackers
exploit a flaw in an exchange’s security mechanisms—the deception,
in this instance, lies in the surreptitious search for the flaw only for
purposes of wrongdoing. In many cases intent will not be difficult to
prove—the hacker, through the act of hacking or deception, intends
to defraud users of the host exchange. Further, private keys may be
analogized to other forms of intangible property the Court
recognizes.231 The wires in this case, the internet connection used to
facilitate the hack, are used in furtherance of the scheme. Lastly, the
wire use is likely interstate: in most jurisdictions, prosecutors need to
show that the origination of use of the wire occurred across state lines
from the servers hosting the exchange. Given the reality of the
modern internet, and the Bitcoin network described above, the
showing required by many courts will be perfunctory.232
Section 1343, then, is the best vehicle for prosecution of Bitcoin
theft. It aligns the congressional purposes behind the statute—a stopgap for new forms of wrongdoing—with language amenable to
encompassing the intricacies that blockchain presents. This stop-gap
function, moreover, will become increasingly important if, or perhaps
more likely when, blockchain-based assets become commonplace as a
way to move and store valuable information.

229. See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710–11 (1989) (citations omitted)
(“[T]he use of the mails need not be an essential element of the scheme. It is sufficient for
the mailing to be ‘incident to an essential part of the scheme . . . .’”).
230. See United States v. Lake, 472 F.3d 1247, 1256 (10th Cir. 2007).
231. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987) (discussing confidential
business information); Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918)
(discussing news information); United States v. Shyres, 898 F.2d 647, 652 (8th Cir. 1990)
(discussing spending control).
232. See Kieffer, 681 F.3d at 1155; Wright, 625 F.3d at 595; see also Global Bitcoin
Nodes Distribution, BITNODES, https://bitnodes.earn.com [https://perma.cc/5VT4-DQ5P].
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IV. EXTRA-LEGAL OBSTACLES TO ENFORCEMENT OF CRYPTOASSET THEFT
While a solid path to prosecution appears to exist, the
application of criminal provisions to theft of Bitcoin does not come
without substantial challenges. As noted above, no one has been
convicted of theft of crypto-assets. Prosecutors seem to prefer to
charge the effects of theft—money laundering of proceeds derived
from selling stolen Bitcoin—by waiting until the thief converts Bitcoin
to cash.233 There are a number of reasons for this approach, and this
discussion will focus on two in particular: resistance from the Bitcoin
community to regulation in any form and the many difficulties Bitcoin
poses for law enforcement. But as the use cases for blockchain grow
and are implemented, addressing these challenges and overcoming
the legal hurdles to prosecution are essential.
A. The Bitcoin Community
The predecessors of Bitcoin trace their roots to libertarian
politics of the early 1980s, which valued absolute privacy and freedom
from any government intervention.234 The earliest advocates of digital
cash235 envisioned complex source code and cryptography as the
avenue to achieve both of those key values.236 This led many of the
same advocates to begin the search for and development of code
written to provide individuals with complete anonymity and control
over transactions.237 While most early efforts failed to gain popular
appeal,238 the digital cash community persevered, as did their general
233. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office N. Dist. of Cal., Russian National
and Bitcoin Exchange Charged in 21-Count Indictment for Operating Alleged
International Money Laundering Scheme and Allegedly Laundering Funds from Hack of
Mt. Gox (July 26, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/russian-national-andBitcoin-exchange-charged-21-count-indictment-operating-alleged [https://perma.cc/NQZ3Z2PX] (abstaining from charging the defendant with theft and instead charging him with
money laundering).
234. See Steve Levy, E-Money (That’s What I Want), WIRED (Dec. 1, 1994, 12:00 PM),
https://www.wired.com/1994/12/emoney/ [http://perma.cc/U2PN-BP89 (dark archive)] (discussing
the 1980’s Digicash inventor’s political ideals).
235. See Eric Hughes, A Cypherpunk’s Manifesto, ACTIVISM: CYPHERPUNK (Mar. 9,
1993), https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html [https://perma.cc/5S4S-7EHD].
236. Id.
237. See David Chaum, Achieving Electronic Privacy, 267 SCI. AM. 96, 96–97 (Aug.
1992). Chaum is regarded as the first inventor of cryptocurrencies when he debuted the
idea for “Digicash” in the 1980s, which would later become a reality in the 1990s. Levy,
supra note 234.
238. See Jeremy Clark, Foreward to NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at IX. The
only exception, PayPal, moved away from the idea of “cryptographic payments,” instead
opting for the payment mechanism to be handled by established banks. See Karlin
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distaste for government regulation.239 Fast forward to 2008, when this
libertarian spirit meets a global financial crisis and subsequent
government bailout—the formerly niche interest suddenly has a wider
audience when the global banking system, trusted by many, failed
spectacularly.240 This general distrust of government intervention has
not subsided and continues to permeate the Bitcoin community.241
Other early Bitcoin advocates, however, recognized the need for
limited government intervention, and that limited prosecution of the
most egregious thefts may be welcomed.242 From a normative
perspective, the rule of law must outweigh libertarian ambitions of
anonymity and privacy, and practically speaking, prosecution of
Bitcoin theft may help, not hinder, the development of the
technology. The balance between encouraging innovation and
maintaining order is tenuous, but both Congress and the courts
indicate that the criminal law is an appropriate vehicle for enforcing
that order.243 Criminal prosecutions deter bad actors—and potential
disrupters of the project—while leaving technological development
largely uninterrupted. And prosecution of bad actors will bolster the
general trust and confidence in blockchain, further incentivizing its
development and application.
B.

Law Enforcement

The most difficult challenge may be left to law enforcement—the
relative anonymity of the crypto-asset thief will require enforcement
agencies to expend tremendous resources, both time and money, to
track down the bad actor. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
Lillington, PayPal Puts Dough in Your Palm, WIRED (July 27, 1999, 12:00 PM),
https://www.wired.com/1999/07/paypal-puts-dough-in-your-palm/ [http://perma.cc/936M-FR9Z
(dark archive)].
239. See Hughes, supra note 235. In the most relevant passage, Hughes notes:
Cypherpunks deplore regulations on cryptography, for encryption is
fundamentally a private act. The act of encryption, in fact, removes information
from the public realm. Even laws against cryptography reach only so far as a
nation’s border and the arm of its violence. Cryptography will ineluctably spread
over the whole globe, and with it the anonymous transactions systems that it
makes possible.
240. POPPER, supra note 35, at 32–33.
241. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 235 (advocating for the resistance of regulation).
242. Wences Cesares, Bitcoin Needs Both Unregulated and Regulated Network Nodes,
XAPO BLOG (May 11, 2017), https://blog.xapo.com/about-Bitcoins-censorship-resistanceregulation/ [https://perma.cc/65DE-3UZH].
243. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Problematic Role of Criminal Law in Regulating
the Use of Information: The Case of the Economic Espionage Act, 80 N.C. L. REV. 853,
858–59 (2002) [hereinafter Moohr, The Problematic Role].
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(“FBI”) was aware of the problem of anonymity and its implications
for theft and other malicious uses of blockchain technology as far
back as 2011.244 To complicate matters further, the blockchain
industry continues to create features to increase the relative
anonymity of users like “mixing services” and multi-signature
transactions.245 And bad actors are paying attention to these
innovations in anonymity, using them as a shield while they search for
new weaknesses in the technology.246 Considering these challenges,
the FBI and other agencies will have to continue to be creative in
forging solutions to these complex new crimes.247
Losses from cybercrime continue to rise, however, and if the
market price of Bitcoin increases drastically or blockchain-based
assets become critical parts of the transfer of business information,
theft will increasingly play a role in that statistic.248 While this may
seem, in the larger scheme of federal criminal enforcement, to be a
minor issue at present, Bitcoin theft fits neatly into other trends of
increasing internet-based crimes already present.249 Data breach—a
crime with obvious similarities to Bitcoin theft—already accounts for
the second-most number of victims in the last year of reported
statistics.250
And, to their credit, enforcement agencies seem to be taking first
steps in meeting the challenge of rapidly advancing technology.251
Private-sector groups are similarly devising ways to use public

244. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, BITCOIN VIRTUAL CURRENCY: UNIQUE
FEATURES PRESENT DISTINCT CHALLENGES FOR DETERRING ILLICIT ACTIVITY 1
(2012), https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2012/05/Bitcoin-FBI.pdf [https://perma.cc/
AXR9-AK8B].
245. KARAME & ANDROULAKI, supra note 52, at 97–120.
246. See Moohr, The Problematic Role, supra note 243, at 857–58; Andy Greenberg,
Mind the Gap: This Researcher Steals Data with Noise, Light, and Magnets, WIRED (Feb. 7,
2018, 8:06 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/air-gap-researcher-mordechai-guri/ [http://perma.cc/
LS32-B7NL (dark archive)] (discussing a new electronic theft technique called
MAGNETO).
247. See Major Financial Crime: Using Intelligence and Partnerships to Fight Fraud
Smarter, News, FBI (Apr. 4, 2012), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/major-financial-crime
[http://perma.cc/Z3FU-SX5Y].
248. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 2016 INTERNET CRIME REPORT 10, 13
(2016), https://pdf.ic3.gov/2016_IC3Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR8Z-RQLA] (explaining
that virtual currencies, such as Bitcoin, are used in theft tactics like extortion and
ransomware).
249. See id.
250. Id. at 17.
251. Cyber Crime, What We Investigate, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber
[http://perma.cc/AL8H-CFAT].
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addresses and information to identify bad actors.252 Chainalysis, for
example, has already established partnerships with the FBI, SEC, and
other agencies.253 It seems likely that social forces around Bitcoin
theft, and possibly a correlated increasing economic effect, will be
crucial in convincing enforcement agencies to dedicate the resources
to overcome these challenges.
CONCLUSION
Bitcoin continues to grab headlines and will continue to play a
part in the national conversation as the use cases for the technology
expand. One can expect that the cases of theft will likely increase as
well. Prosecution of this theft will merely recognize an interest in
Bitcoin that society already acknowledges—Bitcoin is a thing that can
be owned and taking it is an action that the law must punish.
This is not simply important as possible recourse to compensate
victims, or even to deter future thieves, although this will play a part
in the conversation. Rather, action will further fundamental concepts
of the American rule of law—intolerance of unjust takings that
violate another’s rightful ownership interest. And from a practical
perspective, enforcement will provide a necessary stop-gap while
other government actors and agencies grapple with the proper
approach to blockchain-based technologies and the law. A path exists
and should be pursued.
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252. See Mike Orcutt, Criminals Thought Bitcoin Was the Perfect Hiding Place, but
They Thought Wrong, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/
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